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CASE COMMENTS
Action Against State-Liability and Consent of State to SuitConsent Not Prerequisite in Colorado
By PAULINE NELSON
Pauline Nelson is a graduate of the University of Colorado, a student at the
University of Denver College of Law, and a member of the staff of DICTA.
Plaintiff and other Colorado race track associations brought an
action against the Racing Commission and the State Treasurer for a
declaratory judgment to determine, first, whether under the state parimutuel racing act the "breakage"' belonged to the tracks or to the State,
and, secondly, whether plaintiffs were entitled to receive back from the
State Treasurer the "breakage" paid to the State under protest. By
stipulation of the parties the trial court's decision was limited to the
first question only, and decision of the second was deferred. The Colorado Supreme Court reversed a judgment adverse to plaintiffs, and held
the "breakage" should be retained by the tracks.' Plaintiff thereupon
applied to the trial court for determination of its second prayer; and,
after hearing, the court entered judgment in plaintiff's favor for $22,000.
Defendants sought a reversal on the ground the suit was one against
the State in its sovereign capacity; that the State could not be sued without its consent; that the State had not consented to the suit, either by
its participation in the original trial or otherwise; and that there was
no fund from which the judgment could be paid. The Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment in an opinion which describes the doctrine of
sovereign immunity as "archaic" and "outmoded." The Court held a
citizen is entitled to a judicial determination of his rights, whether they
collide with an individual or with the sovereign state. Colorado Racing
Comm'n v. Brush Racing Ass'n, 316 P.2d 582 (Colo. 1957).
In a case decided two months earlier, the Court, while it did not
expressly abrogate the rule of state immunity, accomplished the same
result in a contract action by adopting a theory of implied waiver. In
that case, defendant, the Colorado Department of Agriculture, awarded
to plaintiff a contract for spraying grasshopper-infested range land.
Plaintiff's bid of thirteen cents per acre was made with the understanding that a million and a half acres were to be sprayed, and the written
contract so provided. Plaintiff was permitted to spray only 240,000
acres and was paid for that amount at the contract rate. He then
brought suit for damages for breach of contract. A motion to dismiss
was granted, on the ground the State had not consented to the suit.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a state agency enters
into an authorized contract it thereby waives the State's immunity from
suit. Ace Flying Service, Inc. v. Colorado Dep't of Agric., 314 P.2d 278
(Colo. 1957).
In a concurring opinion in the Ace Flying Service case, Justice
Moore contended the doctrine of sovereign immunity was contrary to
the constitutional guaranty of due process, in that it denied to a plaintiff
his "'day in court" whenever his opponent was the State. The majority
1 "Breakage" is the amount of odd pennies !eft over after computing winning
wagers to the nearest dime.
2 Centennial Turf Club v. Racing Comm'n, 129 Colo. 529, 271 P.2d 1046 (1954).
314 P.2d at 282.
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of the Court, however, followed the usual practice in such cases and
declined to determine the constitutional question when the case could
be decided on another ground. In the Racing Commission case the "implied waiver" theory could not be applied, and the Court then squarely
faced the constitutional issue and declared the courts are open to
decide the rights of citizens, and a remedy will not be denied solely
because the adversary is the State.
Thus, while courts of other jurisdictions have adhered strictly to
the doctrine of immunity, 4 and have left it to the legislatures to relax
its application by statute, Colorado has become a pioneer in abandoning,
by judicial action, the rule that the state may not be sued without its
consent.
The rule of sovereign immunity is one of the oldest known to the
common law, beginning with the theory that the king was above the
law and could do no wrong. It is also one of the most firmly entrenched,
finding its later justification in the idea that it is against public policy
to allow the state's treasury, belonging to all the people, to be depleted
at the suit of a few.
The history of the rule in Colorado began in 1895 with the socalled "Benedictine Sisters Case," 5 an advisory opinion given by the
Supreme Court to the House of Representatives. The House had before
it a bill already passed by the Senate, providing for compensation to the
Sisters for damage to their building, caused by the State's construction
of a canal. The House asked the Court, first, whether the State was
liable; and, secondly, if the State was liable, whether it was within the
province of the Legislature to determine and pay the damages. The
Court advised that the injury was in effect a taking of private property
for public use, and the State was constitutionally liable for just compensation;6 but that since the State was immune from suit the liability
could not be enforced in the courts, and the Legislature was the proper
body to determine the damages and provide for payment.
The question was presented to the Court in an actual controversy
forty years later, when a telegraph company sued for "just compensa4 For collection of cases see Annots., 25 A.L.R.2d 203 (1952); 42 A.L.R. 1464 (1926).
5 In re Constitutionality of Substitute for Sen. Bill 83, 21 Colo. 69, 39 Pac. 1088
(1895).
6 Colo. Const. art. II § 15 (1876).
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tion" for damages caused in removing its pole lines to make way for
construction of a state hospital building. The Court held that although
the State might be liable the courts could not entertain the suit in the
absence of the
State's consent, and plaintiff's only recourse was to the
7
Legislature.
Until 1952 the Colorado court applied the doctrine of sovereign
immunity without limitation in any action which wag clearly against
the State in its sovereign capacity. At the same time, in Colorado as in
other jurisdictions, there developed a distinction between suits against
the State as sovereign and suits against the State as proprietor. The
State could be sued regardless of its consent in any case involving its
"purely business" functions, for example the leasing of state lands.'
Further, there was established the principle that a suit against a
state officer or agency is not necessarily a suit against the state. If an
officer, acting unlawfully and in excess of his authority, invades private
rights, he may be sued for redress. Since his acts are not authorized or
sanctioned by the state, he cannot escape liability by invoking the
state's immunity.9
It is not easy to define the line where a suit nominally against a
state agency ceases to be a suit against the sovereign. Courts have generally stated the test in terms of "controlling" state action-a suit against
the state is one in which a judgment for the plaintiff could operate to
compel performance of an obligation which belongs to the state in its
political capacity, or subject it to a liability for payment of funds out
of the state treasury. If a plaintiff is seeking governmental action which
the state would not otherwise take, or the payment of money which
would not otherwise be paid, the suit is one against the state in its
sovereign capacity and cannot be maintained in the absence of the
state's consent.' 0
From this distinction the Colorado court took the logical next step
and in the Boxberger and Dawson cases," decided in 1952, adopted further limitations on the immunity rule. The Boxberger case was a suit
for cancellation of a deed. It did not involve illegal action by the state
agency, but was grounded on mutual mistake. The court pointed out
the action was not one in tort, not one to impose liability on the state
or to recover money from the state treasury, but merely an action to
restore the status quo. In such a case, the court held, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity must give way to the constitutional rights of the
citizen.
The Dawson decision was the forerunner of the Ace Flying Service
7 State v. Colorado Postal Telegraph Co., 104 Colo. 436, 91 P.2d 481 (1939). See
also Mitchell v. Board of County Commissioners, 112 Colo. 582, 152 P.2d 601 (1944);

Parry v. State Board of Corrections, 93 Colo. 589, 28 P.2d 251 (1933).
s State Board of Land Commissioners v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. App. 436 (1901). See
also Annot., 40 A.L.R.2d 927 (1955).

9 Alfred v. Esser, 91 Colo. 466, 15 P.2d 714 (1932).
0Annot., 160 A.L.R. 332 (1946).
11 Boxberger v. State Highway Dept.. 126 Colo. 438, 250 P.2d 1007 (1952); State
Highway Dept. v. Dawson, 126 Colo. 490, 253 P.2d 593 (1952).
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case, holding that the State's authorized contracts are enforceable to
the same extent as those of an individual. Plaintiff Dawson had furnished gravel to the State Highway Department, which refused payment
in the belief that plaintiff was not the owner. In overruling the State's
defense of sovereign immunity the court emphasized that funds had
been appropriated and "earmarked" for the project in question, and a
judgment would result in no additional financial burdens on the state.
Said the court, "Here no further liability would
accrue other than that
12
anticipated and for which provision is made.1
It should be noted that in none of the Colorado cases was there
any attempt to establish the State's liability in tort. Actions not based
on contract were brought on an "eminent domain" theory, i.e., for compensation for property taken for public use. This was done to escape
the rule against tort liability, established in actions against counties.
Counties in Colorado are by statute subject to suit, 3 but it has been
held consistently that the county, as a branch of government, is not
liable for the torts of its agents. 4 Thus, even in the Racing Commission
case, the court has not touched the State's immunity in tort actions,
where the rule is not merely that the State is not suable, but that the
State is not liable.
The Racing Commission case might have been decided without
upsetting the immunity rule, by a holding that the action was not against
the State but against the State Treasurer for money unlawfully collected.
Since the State interposed the defense, however, the Court
decided the question directly, by holding not that the immunity rule
was inapplicable but that there was no immunity. In doing so the Court
has carried to its ultimate conclusion the trend set in motion by the
Boxberger and Dawson cases.
The effect of the Dawson case was that the State might be sued
in any case where the plaintiff's claim might be paid from an appropriation already made. The same implication is present in the Ace Flying
Service case. This holding was the source of the State's defense in the
Racing Commission case that there was no fund from which the judgment could be paid. Behind this contention is a recognition of the
constitutional requirement that no funds may be paid from the state
12 126 Colo. at 493, 253 P.2d at 594.
13 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 36-1-1 (1953).
14 Richardson v. Belknap, 73 Colo. 52, 213 Pae. 119 (1923); Board of Commissioners
V. Ball, 22 Colo. 125, 43 Pac. 1000 (1896); Board of Commissioners v. Bish, 18 Colo. 474,
33 Pac. 184 (1893). Cf. Board of Commissioners v. Adler, 69 Colo. 290, 194 Pac. 621 (1920);
Board of ConimFsioners v. Colorado Spr~ngs, 66 Colo. 111, 180 Pac. 301 (1919).
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treasury except upon appropriation lawfully made by the legislature.15
It is also acknowledged that a judgment against the state cannot be
collected by execution; 16 in any action against a state the court's authority
ends with the judgment. Thus the State's argument was in effect that
since the courts could go no further they should not go so far-that since
the State's consent might be required to collect the judgment there was
no room to relax the requirement of consent to bring the suit.
In rejecting this contention the court has accomplished a complete
reversal of the advice given in the Benedictine Sisters case. The court
in 1895 declared it was the duty of the legislature, and the legislature
only, to determine the State's liability to a suitor who claims he has been
injured by the State. The 1957 court has placed that duty in the courts,
where it more properly belongs. It may be true that the suitor must
still go to the legislature for payment of whatever may be due him,
but he goes with a claim supported by a court's determination of validity.
The court cannot compel action by the legislature. Control of the
treasury is a legislative power with which the courts cannot interfere.
But the procedure now evolved by the court is a reasonable one, placing
responsibility for initial determination of the claim in the courts.
Colo. Const. art. V § 33 (1876).
16 81 C.J.S. 1343, States § 232 (1953).
15
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